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Abstract 
Policy makers faced with equality-efficiency trade-offs can articulate the nature and extent of their 
health inequality aversion using social welfare functions.  In this study we use data from an online 
survey of the general public in England (n=246) to elicit health inequality aversion parameters by 
numerically solving Atkinson and Kolm social welfare functions.  We elicit median inequality aversion 
parameters of 10.95 for Atkinson and 0.15 for Kolm.  These values suggest substantial concern for 
health inequality among the English general public which, at current levels of quality adjusted life 
expectancy, implies weighting health gains to the poorest fifth of people in society six to seven times 
as highly as health gains to the richest fifth. 
Key words: health inequality; inequality aversion; social preferences; survey; welfare function; 
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1. Introduction 
Health policy has two main objectives, improving health and reducing health inequality.  When these 
two objectives conflict, Health-Related Social Welfare Functions (HRSWFs) can be used to articulate 
the trade-off between them.  Economists have explored the properties of several SWFs which aim to 
capture these trade-offs in the form of a single inequality aversion parameter.  The Atkinson Index 
(Atkinson, 1970) and Kolm Index (Kolm, 1976) are two such forms, concerned with relative and 
absolute concepts of inequality widely used in the income inequalities literature.  A range of two 
person HRSWFs have also been proposed (Wagstaff, 1991, Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2004), and there 
have been various attempts to elicit health inequality aversion parameters for some of these 
functions from interview data of members of the public in England (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011, Edlin 
et al., 2012) and Spain (Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2013). 
Building on the questionnaire instrument employed in these existing studies, we have previously 
conducted methodological work to develop and validate a video animation designed to encourage 
respondents to think carefully about their responses (Cookson et al., 2015).  The contribution of this 
paper is to elicit inequality aversion parameters for the Atkinson and Kolm SWFs using online survey 
data from the general population in England that incorporates this video animation.  These 
parameter values can help to inform health policy makers in England who wish to explicitly 
incorporate social value judgements concerning health inequalities into decisions regarding the 
allocation of health care resources. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 Survey  
Details of the survey methods are reported in Appendix A and the sample characteristics in Appendix 
B.  An online survey was used to obtain a sample of 462 respondents from the English general 
population, of which 246 provided usable data.  Respondents were presented with information 
highlighting inequalities in expected years of life in full health at birth between the richest and 
poorest fifths of people in England.
  
Respondents made a series of seven pairwise choices between 
two programmes which would increase expected years in full health.  In each choice, Programme A 
favoured the richest fifth, and Programme B the poorest fifth.  In the first choice, Programme A 
provided an increase of seven years to the rich and three years to the poor, and Programme B 
provided an increase of three years to the rich and eight years to the poor.  In each successive 
choice, the years gained by the poor group in Programme B were gradually reduced, while 
everything else was fixed.  In each choice the respondents were asked to decide whether the 
government should choose Programme A, Programme B or whether the two programmes were 
equally good.  
 
2.2 Categorisation 
To elicit the inequality aversion parameters we developed a response classification system, which is 
shown in Appendix C.  The point at which the respondent  ?switches ?, or becomes indifferent, 
between the programmes was used to categorise respondents and derive the level of inequality 
aversion.  Those categorised as  ?Pro-Rich ? prefer health gains to the better-off;  ?Health Maximisers ? 
are concerned only with increasing total health;  ?Weighted Prioritarians ? give greater weight to the 
health of the worse-off;  ?Maximin ? respondents are concerned only with improving the health of the 
worst-off; and  ?Egalitarians ? value reducing health inequality so much that they are willing to 
sacrifice potential health benefits to the worst-off. 
 
Figure 1: Iso-welfare curves representing response categories 
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Figure 1 illustrates a range of iso-welfare curves for the Atkinson Index, plotted at different levels of 
inequality aversion corresponding to four selected responses.   The horizontal and vertical axes 
represent the quality-adjusted life expectancy of the poorest and the richest fifths, respectively.  
Point (62,74) is the initial distribution of health, while point (65,81) represents programme A, which 
remains fixed through the seven choices.  The dashed line from (65,77) to (70.5,77) gives the range 
of values from Programme B. 
 
2.3 Social welfare functions and equally distributed equivalents 
The Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE) level of health builds on the concept of EDE income, 
defined as the mean ůĞǀĞů ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝĨĞƋƵĂůůǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚǁŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůǁĞůĨĂƌĞĂƐ
ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?(Atkinson, 1970).  It provides an index of social welfare standardised to the 
mean level of health which enables the comparison of different health distributions. The equations 
for the EDEs used in this paper are: ܧܦܧሺܣݐ݇݅݊ݏ݋݊ሻ ൌ ܪഥǤ ൤ ? ቀு೔ுഥ ቁଵିఌ௜ ݂ሺݔ௜ሻ൨ଵȀሺଵିఌሻ ( 1 ) ܧܦܧሺܭ݋݈݉ሻ ൌ ܪഥ െ ቂቀଵఈቁ ݈݋݃  ? ݁ఈǤሺுഥିு೔ሻ݂ሺݔ௜ሻቃ ( 2 ) 
In these equations, ߝ and ߙ are the inequality aversion parameters for the Atkinson and Kolm 
HRSWFs respectively. ܪ௜ is the level of health (quality-adjusted life expectancy) for subgroup i, ܪഥ is 
the mean level of health for the entire population and ݂ሺݔ௜ሻ the proportion of the population in 
subgroup i.  Unlike most previous studies, our data allow the elicitation of negative parameters for 
individual respondents representing  ?inequality seeking ? judgements, as well as positive parameters 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?inequality averse ? ethical judgements. 
 
2.4 Parameter elicitation 
The point where a given respondent switches from one programme to the other, or selects  ?equally 
good ?, is interpreted to reflect the point at which the respondent is indifferent between the two 
programmes.  The implied inequality aversion parameter for each respondent can then be 
established by numerically solving the EDE equations. 
 
2.5 Establishing a population average 
In order to represent inequality aversion parameter for the population, we use the median response 
rather than the mean.  This is because the inequality aversion parameter approaches infinity for 
 ?Maximin ? responses (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011).  To make the analysis sample as representative as 
possible, population weights for England for age, gender, income and education were derived from 
Understanding Society Wave 4 (Essex., 2015), and used to weight sample responses to construct a 
response set representative of the general population.  Further details of this weighting can be 
found in Appendix B.  To allow for uncertainty, we estimate 95% confidence intervals for each 
parameter using a non-parametric bootstrap of the survey data, resampling from the population 
weighted raw data 2,000 times. 
 
2.6 Sensitivity analyses 
Our classification scheme focused on 'logical ? response patterns in which only one  ?switch ? is 
observed or one programme is selected throughout, and the results reported below include the 246 
responses that provided selections that were consistent with the classification.  We conducted 
sensitivity analyses using more permissive inclusion criteria, including 285 and 317 responses 
respectively, as explained in Appendix D.  
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3. Results 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of responses for each category, after sample re-weighting.  Just 
over half, 50.98%, of the responses were  ?Weighted Prioritarian ?, but there were substantial 
responses in the tails of the distribution with 15.58% being  ?Pro-Rich ? and 27.28% being  ?Egalitarian ?.  
The vast majority of respondents, 81.52%, were willing to trade-off some total health in order to 
reduce health inequality and only 2.91% were strict  ?Health Maximisers ?.  The parameters for each 
categorical response, for each SWF, can be found in Appendix E. 
 
 
Figure 2: Weighted distribution of categorical responses (n=246) 
 
The elicited inequality aversion parameters, and the EDE level of health they imply, are given in 
Table 1.  The results mean that, at initial levels of quality-adjusted life expectancy, incremental 
health gains to the poorest fifth of people in society should be weighted between 6 and 7 times as 
highly as incremental health gains to the richest fifth.  Sample weighted bootstrapping revealed that 
the 95% confidence intervals did not exceed the category in which the median response was. 
 
Table 1: Base Case Inequality Aversion Parameters with 95% Confidence Intervals 
SWF 
Median* Implied weight**  
(95% CI) (95% CI) 
ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ɸ ? 10.95 6.95 
(10.95  ? 10.95) (6.95 - 6.95) 
<Žůŵ ?ɲ ? 0.15 6.20 
(0.15  ? 0.15) (6.20  ? 6.20) 
Footnotes to the table 
* Median preference identified through bootstrapping; population weights used 
** Implied weight of marginal health gain to poorest fifth of the population compared to the marginal health gain to the 
richest fifth of the population at initial health 
 
The median inequality aversion parameters were robust and were not affected by the sensitivity 
analyses using larger samples (see Appendix D for details). 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Comparison to previous literature 
There have been a number of previous empirical studies of health inequality aversion using the same 
basic questionnaire instrument in England (Williams et al., 2005, Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2007, Dolan 
and Tsuchiya, 2009, Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011) and Spain (Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2004, Abásolo and 
Tsuchiya, 2008, Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2013).  All of these studies have found that the majority of the 
population is willing to sacrifice a substantial amount of total health in society in order to reduce 
health inequality, as have most studies using different instruments (Edlin et al., 2012, Attema et al., 
2015).  In most cases it is not possible to extract comparable inequality aversion parameter central 
estimates, because parameters were not reported or are not comparable.  However, Dolan and 
Tsuchiya (2011) report an equivalent Atkinson ɸ value of 28.9, which is considerably larger than our 
value of 10.95.  One reason for the difference may be that their study did not use our animated 
video e-learning intervention which tends to reduce the proportion of respondents expressing 
extreme inequality aversion; another may be that their study used face-to-face rather than online 
administration; a third may be that their study used half-year response categories which allow more 
extreme inequality aversion to be expressed.  Two of the studies in Spain, Abásolo and Tsuchiya 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚďĄƐŽůŽĂŶĚdƐƵĐŚŝǇĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŝŶĚƐƵĐŚĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŬŝŶƐŽŶɸ
value is not identified as the median response violated monotonicity  ? i.e. programme B was 
selected all the way. 
4.2 Application to distributional cost-effectiveness analysis 
To illustrate how this value could be used in practice, we present an example below from a 
distributional cost-effectiveness study of two different ways of spending the same fixed budget for 
increasing uptake of a pre-existing universal bowel cancer screening programme (Asaria et al., 2015).  
Assuming no inequality aversion, it is more cost-effective to spend the budget on a  ?UŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ? 
reminder programme rather than the  ?Targeted ? reminder that reduces health inequality by 
targeting the most income deprived.  As Figure 4 of their paper illustrates, distributional cost-
effectiveness analysis identifies the threshold level of inequality aversion above which the  ?Targeted ? 
reminder ďĞĐŽŵĞƐĐŽƐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ɸA? ?ĂŶĚɲA? ? ? ? ? ? ?Thus the corresponding parameter values 
generated ŝŶŽƵƌƐƚƵĚǇ ?ɸA? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚɲA? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚŝŶƚĞ ǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŽƐƚ
effective after allowing for inequality aversion.  Table 2 illustrates, by computing EDE QALYs per 
100,000 for different levels of inequality aversion. 
Table 2: QALY and EDE QALY gains per 100,000 population 
 
Programme 
Targeted Universal 
Gains in aǀĞƌĂŐĞY>zƐ ?ɸA?ɲA䄀  ? ? 3850 4000 
'ĂŝŶƐŝŶƚŬŝŶƐŽŶY>zƐ ?ɸA? ? ? ? ? ? ? 3310 3260 
'ĂŝŶƐŝŶ<ŽůŵY>zƐ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? ? 3300 3270 
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5. Conclusion 
ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ<Žůŵ ?Ɛŝnequality aversion parameters were elicited using an online survey of 
members of the general public in England.  The vast majority of people who gave useable responses, 
81.52%, were willing to sacrifice gains in total health in order to reduce health inequality.  The 
responses indicate substantial aversion to health inequality among the English general public, in line 
with findings from previous studies.  If these responses are taken at face value, they imply that 
marginal health gains to the poorest fifth should be given between 6 and 7 times the weight of 
health gains to the richest fifth.  The inequality aversion parameters elicited provide values which 
can be used within methods such as distributional cost-effectiveness analysis.  Through using these 
methods societal decision makers can evaluate health policies which have the dual objectives of 
improving population health and reducing health inequality.  
Eliciting health inequality aversion  7 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Survey methods 
Survey administration and recruitment were performed by a commercial online survey company, 
called  ?SmartSurvey ? (https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk).  This survey company has a large pre-existing 
consumer panel of individuals throughout the UK who complete online surveys sponsored by a 
variety of public, private and academic research organisations.  Unfortunately, however, the survey 
company were unable to provide us with response rate information either about selection into the 
panel from the general public, or about selection into our survey from their panel.  The research 
team designed and created the online questionnaire within web-based software provided by 
SmartSurvey.  Respondents completed the survey from personal computers over the internet.  Prior 
to answering the trade-off questions respondents were shown an e-learning video, designed and 
piloted by the research team (Cookson et al., 2015).  This video was intended to increase 
understanding of the trade-offs they were to make and can be accessed at the following link: 
https://vimeo.com/91930211.  After this, each respondent answered additional questions on 
demographics and social attitudes. 
Screenshots of the seven pairwise choices are below; and screenshots of the full online survey are 
available at: www.york.ac.uk/che/research/equity/economic_evaluation/publicviews/ 
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Figure A1: Online trade-off questions 
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Appendix B: Sample characteristics compared with the English population 
This table shows basic descriptive statistics of the sample compared with the English general 
population.  Data for the general population in England are taken from Understanding Society 2014 
(Essex., 2015), a large and representative household sample survey. 
 
Table A1: Comparable sample compositions: general English population and survey sample (n=246) 
Highest 
qualification 
Population in 
England 
Sample 
 
Age group 
Population in 
England 
Sample 
Degree 24.60% 52.85% 
 
18-34 25.69% 29.67% 
Other Higher 
Degree 
11.52% 7.72% 
 
35-49 26.20% 22.76% 
A Level etc 20.22% 13.01% 
 
50-64 24.62% 34.15% 
GCSE etc 19.96% 17.48% 
 
65+ 23.84% 13.41% 
Other 
Qualification 
10.41% 4.88% 
    
No Qualification 13.29% 4.07% 
 
Household 
income before 
tax 
Population in 
England 
Sample 
    
£1000 or Less 7.23% 28.46% 
    
£1001 - 1700 15.02% 19.11% 
Sex 
Population in 
England 
Sample 
 
£1701 - 2700 20.73% 14.63% 
Male 48.29% 48.78% 
 
£2701 - 4200 24.51% 13.41% 
Female 51.71% 51.22% 
 
£4201 or more 32.51% 24.39% 
 
In order to readjust the sample to ensure representativeness weights were generated for each of the 
four dimensions, resulting in 240 independent weights from our sample and the Understanding 
Society sample.  The Stata command bsweights (Kolenikov, 2010) was used to implement a svy 
bootstrap, which executed a bootstrap, for complex survey data.  This method allowed the 
calculation of the 95% confidence intervals for the sample, weighted to reflect a representative 
sample. 
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Appendix C: Response Categorisation 
Responses are denoted by seven-character sequences representing the seven sequential choices in 
the questionnaire.  A response denoted by  ?A ? shows a preference for Programme A,  ?B ? for 
Programme B and  ?= ? for an indifference between the two. BBBB=AA, for instance, indicates that the 
respondent preferred Programme B in the first four choices, was indifferent in the fifth and 
preferred Programme A in the final two choices. 
 
Table A2: Categorisation of responses 
Rank  Category Response 
Indifferent between 
Health gains 
programme A 
Health gains 
programme B 
1 Pro-Rich 1 AAAAAAA 7, 3 3, 8.5 
2 Pro-Rich 2 =AAAAAA 7, 3 3, 8 
3 Pro-Rich 3 BAAAAAA 7, 3 3, 7.5 
4 Health Maximiser B=AAAAA 7, 3 3, 7 
5 Weighted Prioritarian 1 BBAAAAA 7, 3 3, 6.5 
6 Weighted Prioritarian 2 BB=AAAA 7, 3 3, 6 
7 Weighted Prioritarian 3 BBBAAAA 7, 3 3, 5.5 
8 Weighted Prioritarian 4 BBB=AAA 7, 3 3, 5 
9 Weighted Prioritarian 5 BBBBAAA 7, 3 3, 4.5 
10 Weighted Prioritarian 6 BBBB=AA 7, 3 3, 4 
11 Weighted Prioritarian 7 BBBBBAA 7, 3 3, 3.5 
12 Maximin BBBBB=A 7, 3 3, 3 
13 Egalitarian 1 BBBBBBA 7, 3 3, 2.5 
14 Egalitarian 2 BBBBBB= 7, 3 3, 2 
15 Egalitarian 3 BBBBBBB 7, 3 3, 1.5 
 
The table shows each of the 15  ?logical ? responses; where respondents prefer either Programme A or 
B throughout, or have a single  ?switching ? point.  In the cases where respondents  ?switched ? directly 
between the two programmes, rather than explicitly specifying that they considered the two 
programmes to be equal, the health gains at the switching point were assumed to be halfway 
between the two scenarios on either side of the switch.  The point of indifference could not be 
observed for the Pro-Rich 1 and Egalitarian 3 responses; for these respondents it was assumed that 
they would have  ?switched ? at the next logical scenario i.e. where the health of the poorest group 
under Programme B was increased or decreased by another half a year respectively.  
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Appendix D: data quality sensitivity analysis 
There were 462 respondents who partook in the survey. We ĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ? ?unusable ? responses, 
where respondents either (a) answered the questions in less than the five minutes it takes to watch 
the video and/or (b) answered  ?equally good ? to every question.  Of the useable sample of 404 
respondents, there were 158 (39%) which did not fall into our theoretical categorisation, leaving 246 
for the base case analysis.  The first sensitivity analysis included responses that suggest a degree of 
imprecisioŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ?equally good ? in two or more consecutive pairs, and this 
resulted in including an additional 39 responses.  The second sensitivity analysis included responses 
that suggest a degree of instability, whereby two B-to-A switching points were observed suggesting a 
possible one-off error that is subsequently corrected (e.g. BBABAAA).  In this case, we randomised 
which switching point to accept as the correct one, which resulted in including a further 71 
responses.  The median rank did not change in any of these sensitivity analyses, and therefore our 
value for the inequality aversion parameters, based on this median rank, is robust to these 
alternative data quality inclusion criteria. 
 
Table A3: Data quality sensitivity analysis, sample sizes and median categorical rank 
Sensitivity analysis 
Useable responses (N = 404) 
Median rank  ?ŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ?  ?/ŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ? 
Base case 246 60.89% 158 39.11% 11 
First 285 70.54% 119 29.46% 11 
Second 317 78.47% 87 21.53% 11 
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Appendix E: Categorised Inequality Aversion Parameters 
The specific inequality aversion parameters associated with each response category are given for 
each of the SWFs in the table below.  By inputting the parameters below into each SWF the level of 
social welfare for specific distributions can be shown for precise levels of inequality aversion. 
Table A4: Inequality aversion parameters for each response category 
Rank Category ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ?ɸ <Žůŵ ?Ɛ ?ɲ 
1 Pro-Rich 1 -2.075 -0.028 
2 Pro-Rich 2 -1.419 -0.019 
3 Pro-Rich 3 -0.731 -0.01 
4 Health Maximiser 0 0 
5 Weighted Prioritarian 1 0.792 0.011 
6 Weighted Prioritarian 2 1.671 0.023 
7 Weighted Prioritarian 3 2.673 0.037 
8 Weighted Prioritarian 4 3.862 0.053 
9 Weighted Prioritarian 5 5.358 0.074 
10 Weighted Prioritarian 6 7.43 0.103 
11 Weighted Prioritarian 7 10.946 0.152 
12 Maximin A? A? 
13 Egalitarian 1 NA NA 
14 Egalitarian 2 NA NA 
15 Egalitarian 3 NA NA 
 
